This paper examines the impact that demographics have on policy outcomes. In two U.S. cities the impact that aldermanic ward level demographics have on the number of liquor licenses in a ward are measured. In one city the there is a great deal of direct involvement by residents in the issuance process. In the other city level of community involvement is reduced since issuance decisions are handled by elected representatives. The paper does not find a significant difference in outcomes when elected representatives administer policy or when there is more direct community involvement.
INTRODUCTION
In studying voting or spending patterns, it becomes clear that demographics play a large and important role in explaining how groups behave. The young have voting patterns that do not coincide with that of the old. The wealthy do not spend in the same manner as the poor. This paper examines the role of demographics in explaining policy outcomes when there is a high level of direct community input into the decision process.
The paper goes on to examine the relationship that demographics have with policy outcomes when an elected representative administers policy.
The effects that demographics have on spending have been well documented. Poterba (1998) examines the level of spending for K-12 education and its correlation with the number of persons in a state that are elderly. Those persons with school age children have preferences that do not match those of the elderly and differences in voting for educational spending are shown to be significant. The author notes that these differences not only span age differences but racial differences as well. 1 More notice has been taken of how varying demographic groups vote in elections in general. Weisberg (1987) notes that significant differences can be noted in voting by race, income, religion, gender, and region. Aspects as far ranging as voter turn-out to party affiliation have been examined [ (Flanigan & Zingale 1998) , (Jackman 1987) , and (Tullock 1998) ].
The aim of this paper is to examine the role that demographics play in explaining the number of liquor licenses present in neighborhoods in two U.S. cities. High variances 1 See Cutler et al. (1993) for more discussion on racial differences in spending.
in the number of licenses observed in different neighborhoods should reflect the preferences of those persons living in that area.
Another goal of this paper is to examine how policy outcomes are effected when the amount of direct community involvement is not as significant. Instead of voting directly for the number of licenses, the residents have elected representatives that vote for them. North (1990) attributes the economic structure of markets to institutional factors.
Market or policy outcomes can be expected to be influenced by these institutional differences. 2 Depending on the impact that special interests might be able to exert on representatives the outcomes of the representative should mirror that of the community. Smith (1982) examines liquor licenses at the state level. The author observes that certain interest groups will lobby for a greater or smaller number of licenses. "Clearly interest groups will make lobbying efforts and expend resources to secure regulatory policies if the regulation is expected to affect market equilibrium significantly, " Smith (1982 p. 317) . Although this paper does not examine the influence of special interests on policy outcomes its importance should be noted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the institutional framework used in two different U.S. cities for the issuance of liquor licenses. In Section 3 there is a description of the data used and the sources that these data were gathered from. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. The last section has concluding remarks and areas for future research.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
Before examining the data and discussing its sources this section outlines the differences in how two U.S. cities issue liquor licenses and discusses why they are used for comparison. This section also examines the level of community involvement in each system.
2.1

St. Louis
In St. Louis, MO the system used to issue licenses is unique. When a potential applicant wishes to obtain a liquor license, s/he must submit required materials to the liquor commissioners office. In the appendix to this paper there is a copy of the form detailing the items that are required. Two of the items on this list are of particular interest: items 2 and 15-A.
Item 2 lists the fee required for processing the application. During the period of investigation, 1996-1997, the fee was $230.00. The commissioner could seek to maximize revenues by charging high application fees. Such behavior by the commissioner could alter policy outcomes. In such a case revenue maximization would occur when fees are set such that license demand is unitary elastic. In other regulated industries where licenses are required to conduct business, the fees for these licenses can be quite high. Markets have been created for the purchase and sales of these licenses. 3 If the St. Louis commissioner was indeed a revenue maximizer, it was unlikely that it was done through the sale of licenses. The $230.00 fee was just enough to handle the administrative costs of preparing a file for the new applicant and running necessary background checks.
Until December of 1996 the fee was returned if the application was denied. It is clear that for the period before 1997 the commissioner was not a revenue maximizer since returning the application fee meant that administrative costs were not being met through this fee. For the period after 1997 a maximizer would have charged a fee well above costs.
There is no resale of licenses in St. Louis. If an owner of a license decides to sell the establishment, the buyer must apply for a new license. As Krishna (1993) points out in the case of taxi cab licenses, if the license can not be sold in a secondary market and there is not a limit on the total number of licenses available, the value of the license should be measured in terms of expected future profits.
Another interesting feature of the license application process in St. Louis is item 15-A. This is a requirement that the applicant get the "consent" of a majority of residents around the proposed location. When the applicant applies for a license s/he is required to get the names of all property owners and residents in a radius of 350 feet around the proposed cite. This information is available from the Board of Elections. In a radius of 350 feet there can be as many as 500 or as few as 100 eligible voters.
To obtain consent, the applicant leaves a postcard for each registered voter at the address listed. The owner of the property is also given a postcard. This postcard simply states that the applicant is seeking a liquor license at the proposed site. The voter is then instructed to check 'yes' or 'no' to reveal her/his preferences. The postcard is then mailed back to the commissioners' office.
The commissioner ensures that the applicant has not bribed or intimidated the residents, and then follows up with a sample of eligible voters to ensure that everyone was given a card. The commissioners' office is also charged with detecting fraud or other illegal methods the applicant might use to gain consent. Thus, the amount of community involvement is quite substantial for license issuance in St. Louis. However, the typical level of community involvement in other cities is much less because a proxy is used for direct community voting. The system used in Milwaukee, WI., which is most commonly used, will be discussed next.
Milwaukee
In the city of Milwaukee, WI., the city council has a five member subcommittee that oversees the issuance of licenses for the entire city, a common practice in American cities. The necessary requirements such as a valid business permit, state proof of voter registration, and federal identification numbers for a license are similar to those required in St. Louis, and indeed in most cities. There is no community consent requirement, however. Residents are able to voice their opinions concerning the issuance of any license during public hearings.
There is an application processing fee required in Milwaukee just as there is in St.
Louis. During the period of August 1996 through July 1997, the fee was approximately $610.00. The processing fee was not returned if the license was denied. This fee was used for the administrative costs of processing the application. In Milwaukee as well as St.
Louis the processing fees were just above costs. If the fee were being used as a revenue generator then it would be expected that these fees would be as far above costs as the market could bear. In addition, there is no resale value associated with the license. A potential buyer of a liquor establishment must apply for a new license.
The main difference in the licensing process between the two systems is the level of community involvement. In one system the community is more directly involved in voting. In the other system elected representatives vote for the community. Most other administrative details are similar between the two systems, making them ideal for comparison. The analysis that follows will investigate whether policy outcomes vary when elected representatives vote for residents as opposed to a system where the community is more directly involved.
Zupan ( On the other hand, political influence could alter the voting patterns of subcommittee members. That is to say, a contributor to the re-election campaign of a subcommittee member might positively sway the decision for issuance of a license even if the residents of the proposed site oppose the license. In the St. Louis system it would be much more difficult to influence the commissioner, given that community consent is still required. This seems to be validated by the fact that no license has ever been issued without community consent. This paper will examine the correlation that neighborhood demographics have with the number of licenses that are present in the St. Louis system. The paper will then examine the correlation of these demographics with the number of licenses present when the level of community involvement is reduced and elected representatives decide on the number of licenses.
THE DATA
The data presented in this section show the demographic characteristics of aldermanic wards in both St. Louis and Milwaukee. Initially, we will examine the relationship between certain ward characteristics and the number of liquor licenses in that ward.
Data on demographics were collected from the Missouri State Census Data
Center, the U.S. Census, the Department of Public Safety (Excise Division) for the city of and 34 are presented along with the percentage of persons in a ward that are 35 and older.
The preferences of the age cohorts are such that more or fewer licenses could be desired by each. The data are presented with this split only because it was consistent for both cities.
The percent of a ward zoned for commercial property was also gathered. Licenses can only be issued in areas zoned for commercial property. Ceteris paribus, the greater the area zoned for commercial property, the more licenses should be expected. Toma (1988) examined how proximity to licenses in adjoining counties affected license issuance. The idea is that residents with a large number of licenses in adjoining counties might prefer not to have any licenses in their own. The number of licenses in adjoining wards is measured using a proximity variable.
The median house value in a ward is presented. If liquor licenses are associated with lower property values, then those residents with higher property values should oppose having large numbers of licenses. The median house value also serves as a proxy for income. Since the two are highly correlated, this variable should incorporate income effects.
Another variable that was collected, depicted the percentage of the population in a ward that had a college degree. Once again, the preferences of these residents could suggest greater or fewer licenses.
The independent variable that was collected listed the total number of licenses present in a ward. In addition, licenses were characterized as two broad types. A license was classified as either a 'Drink' license or a 'Package' license. A Drink license meant that alcohol came in a per-drink fashion and were not allowed to be taken off of the premises. This would include restaurants that served alcohol and bars. A Package license meant that alcohol was sold in its original container and was unopened. This type of license would be most commonly associated with a liquor store.
Some descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 for St. Louis and Milwaukee respectively. The model assumes that each y i , the number of licenses in a ward are drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameters λ i . In this case λ i is estimated from the model and is the mean and variance of the distribution. Here, β β β β i is the vector of coefficients that are estimated which describe the linear relationship between x i , the matrix of independent variables, and ln λ i yielding probability estimates, Y i , about the distribution of licenses. 5 See Greene (1993) and Degroot (1975) Since rejection rates were comparable in both communities, this would imply some supply side effects. The number of absolute rejections, as opposed to rates, would be helpful here, although not available. If fewer applicants apply in Black areas this could explain the negative relationship with licenses, excluding income effects or preferences.
THE RESULTS
Community
The percentage of renters had a positive and significant relationship with licenses.
This would imply that property value concerns are lessened in communities with high levels of renters. Conversely, the estimated coefficient for median house value was negative and significant. Other statistically significant variables included persons aged 18 to 34, the percentage of commercial property, and the number of licenses in surrounding wards. Table 3 shows that some demographic variables were significant in explaining the number of liquor licenses present in a community. Because residents were able to have more involvement in the issuance process, the number of licenses in a given ward should more accurately reflect the preferences of those residents, given their demographic makeup. We now examine how these same demographic variables impact the number of licenses in a community when the level of community involvement in the issuance process is much smaller.
The results presented in Table 4 are for the city of Milwaukee. Under the system used here, a subcommittee of the aldermanic board oversees license issuance. In many respects, the results are similar to those presented in Table 3 . The median house value and the percentage of the population that were Black had negative and significant estimated coefficients. In addition, the percentage of a ward zoned for commercial property and the percentage of persons aged 18 to 34 both had positive and significant estimated coefficients.
Policy outcomes did differ in some respects. The density of an area was positively related to licenses in Milwaukee. No information about the size capacity of liquor establishments was given, so this result could be more closely related to the St. Louis results than it seems.
The percentage of renters was not statistically significant in Table 4 for the city of Milwaukee. This variable was significant in Table 3 for the city of St. Louis. It did have a positive sign on the estimated coefficient, however. This result could reflect a divergence from voter preferences to representative voting. Table 3 showed the impact of demographics on outcomes when residents had a high level of involvement in the process. Table 4 showed the impact that those same variables had on outcomes when the level of direct involvement was reduced. There does not appear to be a substantial amount of difference in outcomes when the level of direct involvement is reduced due to institutional change in the issuing process.
License Composition
Another interesting aspect of these data are revealed when an examination is conducted of policy outcomes when the license can be distinguished by type. As stated previously, licenses were placed in two broad categories: Drink or Package.
Preferences towards licenses might vary by type. Policy outcomes might vary according to demographics if the license were for a bar or restaurant as opposed to a liquor store. Table 5 shows the relationship of demographics and policy outcomes in the city of St. Louis.
The results for Drink licenses did not vary greatly from those of all licenses presented in Table 3 . For St. Louis, proximity was not found to be statistically significant in Table 5 . It did however retain the same sign of the estimated coefficient. 6 For Package licenses there appeared to be a greater divergence from the results of Table 3 . Only two variables were statistically significant: density and median house value. Both variables were negatively related to package licenses. The variation in Package licenses was not large. In addition, Package licenses made up less than 23 percent of all licenses in St. Louis. These factors influence the results in Table 5 . Table 6 presents the same examination as Table 5 for the city of Milwaukee Policy outcomes were similar for Drink licenses when compared to all licenses. For Package licenses the relationship of density and the median house value were statistically significant and negative, similar to those of Table 4 .
In addition to density and median house value, the results of Overall, the impact that demographics had on policy outcomes under the St. Louis system did appear to be significant. Median house values and the percentage of the ward zoned for commercial property did affect the number of licenses present. Under the Milwaukee system there did not appear to be a substantial difference in the impact that demographics had on policy outcomes when the level of direct community involvement is reduced.
Representative Voting
Elected representatives live in the ward that they represent. Table 7 is similar to Table 6 for Milwaukee but includes a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the that ward's representative was a member of the subcommittee that oversaw licenses. Helland (1999) examines the extent to which elected committee members use their membership to reward constituents in their district by insuring 'pork' for their district. In other words, the persons on the committee have the ability to steer the benefits of their committee back to their home district. Controlling for district representation did not dramatically alter the outcomes previously presented. Being in a represented ward did mean fewer licenses, and this effect was significant but did not alter the impact that the other demographic variables had on outcomes.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to examine the relationship between ward level demographics and the number of liquor licenses in that ward. The system used to issue licenses in St.
Louis allowed an examination of the impact that these ward level demographic characteristics had on licenses when there was the potential for more direct community involvement. The data suggest that some demographic characteristics do have an impact on the number of licenses present. In particular, the median house value in the ward and the percentage of renters had significant correlation with the number of licenses.
When the issuance system is such that an elected representative directs the issuance of licenses, leading to less direct community involvement, the data suggests that the impact of ward level demographics on policy outcomes does not change significantly.
However, under a system of 'representative' issuance, the relationship between the percentage of renters in a ward and the number of licenses becomes insignificant. There does not appear to be large a change in outcomes when the system is changed.
If the data can be gathered, a time series analysis would be an interesting extension. There is considerable movement within a city. It would be interesting to watch how the changing demographics of a neighborhood are reflected in licenses.
variance in Package licenses per ward. 
APPENDIX
In most of the tables presented in the body of the paper, the Poisson model was used to examine the relationship between demographics and policy outcomes at the ward level. The major difference between the St. Louis system and the Milwaukee system is the level of direct involvement by the residents.
The rationale for presenting these results separately as opposed to a pooled model is that we believe a structural shift occurs in the data and that pooling would not yield useful information. To test the hypothesis that the regression coefficients are statistically different for the two systems, Table A-1 shows the results of a Chow test. Table A-1 confirms that a significant change occurs in the data between the two systems; therefore, pooling was not used. 8 As was mentioned before, all of the results reported in the paper are at the ward level since representative voting occurs at this level and wards are more easily identified.
Two minor concerns arise when presenting ward level results. The first concern is that in the St. Louis system, voting occurs on a scale much smaller than the ward level. The second issue is an econometric one: ward level results reduce the degrees of freedom in the model and could introduce bias.
To address both of these concerns, Tables A-2 The specifications of Tables A-2 and A-3 were altered slightly from Tables 2 and   3 in the body of the paper. Ward level dummies were included to account for omitted variable bias that might have been present. As was stated in the body of the text, unaccounted for political influence could alter policy outcomes.
Because the number of observations in both Tables A-2 
